This is just a quick one. Most Office 365 admins will hopefully have a separate admin account to perform higher level tasks, compared to their normal user account.
Because of this, the admin accounts shouldn’t need any licensing, because they’re not being used like a normal user. One person shouldn’t need to have two sets of licenses – but there are some problems that can come up because of this.
For example, if you want to use your admin account to access someone’s mailbox, that can be difficult when you don’t have a mailbox yourself to log onto, to then open another user’s mailbox. Outlook can be used to work around this, where you set up a profile for the email address of the user you want to access, but enter your admin credentials when prompted:
The above works OK, but is a little time consuming if you’re accessing a mailbox for a quick check.
If you try to go to Outlook Online, you’ll get a message saying your admin account doesn’t have a license or a mailbox. To get around this, you’ll need to use a URL like:
This had been on my to-do list for a little while since I heard about it (mostly from Daniel Streefkerk who quite rightly has been drawing attention to this via Twitter, thanks!)– and it should be on yours too.
By default, Basic Authentication is allowed as an authentication method in Exchange Online. This is because that’s the ‘standard’ way things have worked for a very long time – you want to get your emails, you provide a username and password and you’re done.
In our modern world, that doesn’t work too well anymore. It’s too risky in that many ways, and things like 2FA and Conditional Access add an extra layer of security when logging in. That’s great, but many systems weren’t built or haven’t been updated to support this – they’ll just fail when logging in.
What this leaves us with, is an internet exposed authentication system that accepts username and password logins without any other layers of authentication, even if you have 2FA and conditional access turned on.
As per Microsoft’s documentation around disabling basic authentication covers, this lets attackers use brute force or spray attacks to try different credentials to get into your tenant. With the amount of leaks we see these days (register on Troy Hunt’s https://haveibeenpwned.com/ if you haven’t already), it’s likely attackers are hitting Microsoft servers with correct accounts of your staff members. If they manage to get the right password – which is very possible if people end up using an old password they used years ago, or password changes were disabled because you thought you were covered with 2FA – they now have valid credentials to get in and pretend to be that staff member, often to then send emails to all their contacts with a malicious link or some other scam.
And with that, you’ll have all existing and future accounts protected from the risks of leaving Basic Auth enabled. Of course if you have a special requirement where a few accounts do need Basic Auth, create another policy, enable basic auth on it, and apply it to those accounts. Your attack surface will still be greatly decreased, and hopefully you’ll eventually be able to disable basic auth on those too.
Back in 2015, I wrote about the first addon. Now here we are in 2019, and somehow I’ve ended up with another.
There he is, the reason my wife and I get little sleep – Oscar. Thankfully we are all happy and healthy with Oscar doing really well.
I knew what I was getting into a bit more this time with #2, and I knew it wasn’t going to be easy. The way I mentally coped with this was to wind down a lot of the extra bits and pieces I had going on – writing gigs, blogging here, handing off my user group for a bit and other extra curricular activities – for me personally, I needed to put myself in a position where I would have the time I needed to look after a baby (along with a soon-to-be 4 year old!).
My wife is great, as she takes the after midnight shift which is the hardest, and with any luck will get some sort of rest during the day – but this will continue to take a toll on us for the next few months.
This is why my blog hasn’t been updated since early December, and I’ve been generally quiet elsewhere. I partly feel guilty for doing it, I’ve got things like my Microsoft MVP award to maintain, but all that is secondary to family.
Thankfully everyone I’ve spoken to has been incredibly accommodating and supportive when I’ve said I need a break. My day job is enough of a time eater already, and I need to save all the energy I have for that!
I’ll get back into more things eventually, but I’m making sure I don’t rush into too much.
I appreciate everyone who reads, comments or even tells me when I’ve got something wrong (like a typo!). Hopefully I’ll start coming across things worth writing really soon (I have something in mind already), but if I’m less responsive than normal you now know why.
If you’ve noticed this option in Outlook, you might wonder where it comes from:
On a new/reply email window in Outlook, under the ‘Options’ tab is a button called ‘Permission’ (which in the future based on the time of writing, is changing to be called ‘Security’). This by default has three or four options, which seem to be dependent on the version of Outlook being run (MSI vs CTR). Click To Run has another called ‘Encrypt-Only’ which I haven’t tested yet.
These options are actually using Azure Information Protection (AIP) to encrypt your email. That’s a giant topic in itself, but the one liner is that wherever you send an encrypted email to, needs to sign in to view the message. In some scenarios this works seamlessly, such as sending to an external user also using Exchange Online. In other scenarios they’ll need to click a button to log in and view the email via their browser.
The ‘Tenant name – Confidential’ and ‘Tenant name – Confidential View Only’ are default AIP labels. You can view/edit these by going to your Azure portal and looking under Azure Information Protection > Classifications > Labels.
As you’ll see in the screenshot above, the two labels I mentioned are listed, and you can go into those and disable them if you don’t want them to appear for your users (there’s a toggle for ‘Enabled’ set to ‘On’, set that to ‘Off’). You could also completely disable Azure Information Protection, but that might cause you other problems if you want to use AIP in any way.
You might be wondering why you’d want to turn these off, encryption and security is good right? You might not be ready for users to start using this yet for support reasons, you might have a different method of securing emails, or you might be using a 3rd party backup system. That backup system won’t be able to read encrypted emails by default – so unless you can get that working somehow, you will only have copies of emails that contain a link to the actual content that require the right access to get to the contents – not a true backup.
Getting back to the title of this article – Do No Forward. If you’re at this stage, you may have noticed that it’s not actually a label listed. As covered in this documentation, it’s inbuilt rather than being a customisable policy, template or tag.
You can turn off this single function in the Azure portal under Azure Information Protection > Policies > Policy: Global and toggling the ‘Add the Do Not Forward button to the Outlook ribbon’ to Off:
There is a registry trick to disable this from Outlook too, which was given to me by Microsoft Support:
Open registry key editor: HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Common\DRM 14.0 = 2010 15.0 = 2013 16.0 = 2016 2.On the Edit menu, point to New, and then click DWORD (32-bit) Value.
Type DisableDNF, and then press ENTER.
In the Detailspane, right-click DisableDNF, and then click Modify.
In the Value databox, type 1, and then click OK.
Exit Registry Editor.
This will at least grey out the option so it can’t be used. The option will still be usable in Outlook via Web, and if I find a solution to that I’ll update this post. As far as I know at this stage, it can’t be hidden or removed.
Update: It’s possible to hide this in OWA also.
The ‘Encrypt’ or ‘Protect’ button (Right now I see different options in different tenants) can be hidden with this PowerShell command:
I struggle to fit these issues into a short but descriptive headline sometimes :)
This issue is a little strange. If you didn’t know any better (like me), you’d expect the location of a user’s mailbox to have no impact whatsoever on the function of ‘Recent’ document history inside of Microsoft Excel and Word, but it actually does.
I found this out the hard way of course, when a couple of staff mentioned their recent lists had disappeared and it co-coincided with their Exchange on-prem to Exchange online migration.
The short of it is that the Office applications detect what sort of login you’re using – if it’s Active Directory (AD) or Azure Active Directory (AAD). When that state changes, it uses a different registry path for a few things, including those recent documents.
Without knowing for sure but based on my testing, it must be doing some check to see if the associated account’s mailbox is in Exchange Online or not – and if not, it considers it an AD account. It doesn’t matter if you already have the users in Azure AD, Single Sign on and all that other good stuff set up – the single change of changing the mailbox location to online triggered the change for me.
For an AD account, the history paths are saved in the registry here:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Word\User MRU\AD_1234567890 (the number on the end is some sort of unique GUID).
For an Exch account, it’s in this slightly different path:
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Word\User MRU\ADAL_1234567890 (again, unique GUID at the end).
In case you were wondering, MRU stands for ‘Most Recently Used’. AD is to do with on-prem Active Directory, and ADAL is (according to that reddit post) Azure Active Directory Authentication Library.
Also note the example above is for Word, there’s corresponding paths for other Office applications such as Excel.
There’s two subkeys below this key, one for File MRU and the other Place MRU.
The good news on hitting this scenario is that the values can just be exported, the path changed and re-imported. To do this, via regedit find the registry key that has the values you want (probably the AD one) and right click > export.
Find the file you exported and use notepad to do a find and replace on all the entires for AD_1234567890 and replace to the new value (which you can find from just looking in the registry).
Now, re-import the registry file and you’ll have all the recent document paths restored.
This should only be a one time problem for migrations, and only for people who had a bunch of document paths saved in there and can’t find where they are easily.